“International organizations rarely die—they are hollowed out.”

Professor Debre, shortly before the U.S. election in November 2024, you predicted that a second Trump term would make the world more conflict-ridden, drive the U.S. out of international organizations, erode human rights standards, and bring Washington closer to autocracies. Were you right?

Prof. Dr. Maria J. Debre: Yes, unfortunately, on almost every point. Trump claims he ended eight wars. Yet data from the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) for 2025 show more interstate conflicts than at any time since 1946. The U.S. itself has intervened militarily in Yemen, Iran, the Caribbean, the Pacific, and Venezuela. In none of these cases did this occur with a mandate from the UN Security Council.

Although the U.S. is still present in international organizations, it is pulling back as a financial contributor. At the United Nations alone, it has approximately five billion dollars in unpaid dues. In votes, they are increasingly siding with the “no” camp, and in the Third Committee of the General Assembly—which is responsible for human rights—the number of consensus resolutions has shrunk from 34 in 2024 to 15 in 2025. Added to this are numerous withdrawals from international organizations and agreements: Five were announced in 2025, including the World Health Organization (WHO), the UN Human Rights Council, and the Paris Climate Agreement. In January 2026, the government announced its withdrawal from 66 additional organizations and bodies in one fell swoop, ranging from large organizations such as UN Women to smaller, lesser-known ones.

The shift is just as pronounced when it comes to human rights. The refugee cap fell from 125,000 in fiscal year 2024 to 7,500 in fiscal year 2026, and the U.S. became the first country since the process was introduced in 2006 to skip its own human rights review before the United Nations. The shift toward closer ties with autocracies is also evident, most clearly in sanctions policy. Sanctions were eased in 2025 and 2026 against Syria, Belarus, Venezuela, and Hungary, while new coercive measures were imposed on democracies and their institutions, such as Brazil, South Africa, Denmark, and the International Criminal Court. In addition, arms deals with Saudi Arabia reported to Congress have increased nearly tenfold within a year, from $4.6 billion to $44 billion.

So is multilateralism primarily a victim of Trump?

Debre: No, the U.S. is part of a larger trend. It is itself a case of autocratization: The V-Dem Institute now classifies it only as an electoral democracy. While such a system formally features free and competitive elections, it lacks essential democratic standards, such as effective checks on the government and the protection of individual civil liberties.

What matters most, however, is what is happening in international organizations as a whole. In our DFG project “Autocratization, Policy Preferences, and the Performance of International Organizations (APPIO),” political scientist Professor Dr. Thomas Sommerer of the University of Potsdam and I are examining the membership of 72 organizations. Their democratic quality peaked in 2012 and has been declining steadily ever since. Currently, only 37 of these 72 organizations have a democratic majority; in 2010, that number was 52. In the United Nations, the WHO, and UNESCO, the proportion of democracies is at or even below 50 percent. Even in the Euro-Atlantic core—that is, the EU, NATO, OECD, OSCE, and the Council of Europe—the proportion of liberal democracies has fallen from 72 to 51 percent since 1995.

What does this shift mean for the protection of human rights in these organizations?

Debre: The effect depends on what kind of autocratization we’re looking at. States whose democracies are currently eroding fear their own opposition above all else and are less supportive of human rights standards. Autocracies that are becoming increasingly closed off, on the other hand, are concerned about their reputation and even show more support outwardly. At the same time, international pressure has shifted: Since around 2010, criticism in the UN Human Rights Council has increasingly been directed at eroding democracies rather than autocracies. States are adjusting their behavior accordingly. In the most recent review cycle, eroding democracies—under increasing scrutiny—are accepting more recommendations, while autocracies—under diminishing scrutiny—are accepting fewer. International scrutiny is effective, but only where it is directed.

Civil society, in particular, is coming under pressure. In 2023, only 38 percent of accreditation applications were approved by the United Nations NGO Committee. Eleven of the 19 member states of this committee themselves severely restrict the space for civil society in their own countries.

So are we witnessing the end of multilateralism?

Debre: In academic circles, there are two camps on this issue. One sees the end of the liberal order; the other sees a potential renewal. I see, above all, an erosion and transformation. International organizations rarely die; they change from within. The U.S. relies on withdrawals and overt coercion. Autocracies, on the other hand, remain in the organizations and reinterpret the rules from within—and now do so with their own majorities.

China, for example, advocates for “true multilateralism.” That sounds like international law, but it primarily refers to state sovereignty. Human rights are mentioned, but not demanded. Non-state actors are left out. That is why, together with my colleague from John Cabot University in Rome, Daniëlle Flonk, I refer to this as “hollow” multilateralism.

What role can the EU play in this new order?

Debre: The Horizon project ENSURED, coordinated by my former colleague and co-author Professor Dr. Hylke Dijkstra at Maastricht University, presented very compelling recommendations in September. The EU cannot replace Washington, but it can keep the organizations functioning in which norms are actually implemented.

There are various ways to achieve this. First, providing reliable, multi-year funding where the U.S. leaves the biggest gap and where autocracies are most likely to undermine procedures: at the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, the Special Rapporteurs, or the International Criminal Court, coupled with reporting requirements and implementation.

Second, finding new partners. The EU cannot restore democratic majorities in global organizations, but it can form coalitions with countries such as Brazil, South Africa, or India, which vote differently on specific issues than the autocratic blocs. What matters here is not so much the number of partnerships as their nature. Relations with the African Union or India, for example, are considered among the EU’s most important, but they lack reciprocity—a fact that potential partners note very carefully. Coalitions will only succeed if the EU eliminates these double standards and treats the interests of these states as independent, not as deviations from a European norm.

Third, ensure greater protection for civil society within the United Nations’ own procedures—that is, through accreditation rules, protection against reprisals, and direct support for local organizations. This also includes insisting on competitive candidacies and minimum human rights criteria in elections to the Human Rights Council and the UN Accreditation Committee, rather than rubber-stamping pre-agreed lists.

Finally, the EU itself must credibly live up to its values internally. Our data show that the proportion of liberal democracies within the EU itself has fallen from 100 to 63 percent. This internal division creates a disconnect between what the EU advocates externally and what it does at home—for example, in outsourcing migration control. An EU that criticizes the U.S. for deportations to third countries while simultaneously concluding similar agreements will not be heard in Geneva.